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You know, Ali, it’s hard enough to start a revolution.
Even harder to sustain it.
And hardest of all to win it.
But it’s only afterwords once we’ve won,
That the real difficulties begin.
 - Film: The Battle of Algiers (1966)
What is human warfare but just this; an effort to make the laws of God and nature take 
sides with one party.
 - Henry David Thoreau 
INTRODUCTION - MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI AND THE AFTERMATH OF 
OPERATION AJAX 
 Recent developments, collectively known as the “Arab Spring,” have renewed American 
interest in the Middle East. The difficulties faced by these revolutionary forces to establish more 
democratic, transparent, and participatory governments have their origins in a unique complex of 
historical and social forces in the region. The Iranian Revolution of 1979, commonly  referred to 
as the Islamic Revolution, is arguably the most significant regional event, both in its immediate 
consequences and its far-reaching implications, of the twentieth century. In 1979, the Iranian 
revolutionaries too sought greater autonomy and accountability from their government and 
independence in its foreign policy. The Revolution overthrew the American-supported monarch 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and replaced his government with an Islamic Republic directed by 
radical Iranian mullahs. Before Mohammad Reza Shah’s downfall, his reign was marked by 
significant economic growth. However, this growth also prompted riots and unrest in the years 
leading up to the Revolution. Despite the Shah’s close relationship with the United States of 
America, or perhaps because of it, his reign was a volatile one. Prime Minister Mohammad 
Mossadeq, a zealous nationalist and founder of the National Front political party, advocated for a 
stronger, more independent Iran that would be less reliant upon the United States and Great 
Britain. In 1953, Mossadeq and his supporters were successful in forcing the Shah into exile. The 
United States government, however, was not ready to lose one of their chief allies in what they 
considered to be such a strategic region. As a result, in a coup d'état orchestrated by the 
American Central Intelligence Agency and the British Secret Intelligence Service, the Shah was 
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restored to power and Mossadeq was placed under house arrest. This notorious coup, known as 
Operation Ajax, solidified the view of many Iranians that the Shah was simply a puppet of the 
American government and, perhaps, foreshadowed the threat to the Shah’s rule in the coming 
decades. After the crushing defeat of Mossadeq, a popularly elected leader, how, then, was the 
public organized and motivated to rise again against the Shah just two decades later?
 Indeed, the major element of the Iranian Revolution that unnerved the American 
government, and even more broadly, the Western world, was the establishment of an Islamic 
cleric, Ayatollah Khomeini, as the leader of the new Islamic Republic. Never before had a 
modern nation-state been established with a stated aim of its government to strive for a strict 
adherence to religious law, in this case Shari’a Law, as outlined in the Qur’an, the Holy Book of 
Islam. The Ayatollah’s rise to power sent a clear message to the United States: no longer would 
Iran be an instrument of America’s foreign policy. The Islamic takeover drastically altered the 
power balance in the region and radically changed the politics of the Cold War, which sent 
shock-waves around the world. 
 How did the Ayatollah overcome the strength of the Shah and his American allies? There 
are numerous factors that contributed to the Shah’s downfall; no one explanation is sufficient to 
explain the defeat of the monarchy. In many ways, Ayatollah Khomeini was simply an 
opportunist who, though in exile throughout the revolutionary period, seized control of the 
precarious situation in Iran. The air of mystique that surrounded this vocal opponent of the Shah 
certainly engaged the various members of the opposition movement, aiding his goal to bring the 
Shah’s rule to an end. By keeping his promises purposefully vague for the post-revolutionary 
period, Khomeini was able to galvanize the many facets of the opposition to the Shah. In the 
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wake of Operation Ajax, when average Iranians were disheartened by their inability to affect 
political decisions in their government without foreign interference, was Khomeini’s ascent to 
power inevitable? Clearly, the Iranian Revolution was much more significant than the imposition 
of a theocracy under a radical mullah. While the religious nature of the Revolution is obviously 
important, there was a combination of political and economic forces, combined with the Shah’s 
ambiguous leadership  and brutal repression tactics, that motivated the average Iranian to rise up 
and join in the overthrow of his reign. Many opposition figures did not want to instill a 
theocracy, yet by the late 1970s they were left with no choice but to support Khomeini, finding it 
impossible to oppose the fervently religious figures of the opposition. Supporting the charismatic 
Ayatollah and his organized network of radical mullahs appeared as the only  realistic choice 
which could ultimately  remove the entrenched Shah. These wary opposition forces reluctantly 
allied themselves with Khomeini, for the alternative of retaining the Shah was unacceptable. 
 The traditional influence of the Islamic leadership, the ulama, was not the sole catalyst in 
replacing the Shah with Khomeini. Researching the economic ramifications of the Shah’s 
modernization policies is key  to unearthing how such an unexpected, though arguably inevitable, 
revolution could occur in the first  place. The White Revolution, a broad program of 
modernization undertaken by the Shah in the 1960s, was enacted with American monetary 
support in order to improve the national infrastructure, industry, and economic development of 
Iran. However, throughout the 1970s, an ever growing wealth disparity  between the few Iranians 
who benefited from the Shah’s modernization policies and the much more numerous poor 
Iranians began to develop. The traditional influences of the bazaars as the center of economic 
transactions, urban production, and even religious institutions, such as the mosques or madrasas, 
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were threatened by  this modernization program. The policies of the White Revolution had two 
major repercussions on the internal structure of pre-revolutionary  Iran. First, these policies 
uprooted an increasing number of rural peasants and poor farmers and pushed them into the 
slums of the larger cities, inflating the bazaars with growing numbers of embittered, unemployed 
Iranians. Secondly, and arguably the most  important when considering the downfall of the Shah, 
was his government’s failure to provide political reform in addition to economic reform in Iran. 
The Shah’s secret police force, SAVAK, enforced this policy of political repression. Widely 
documented cases of torture and execution of the Shah’s opponents are available today. Anyone 
so bold as to voice opposition to the Shah was immediately silenced through imprisonment, 
torture, and even murder. Because of these policies of repression, madrasas and mosques were 
increasingly  the only meeting place for the swelling number of economically  disaffected Iranians 
to gather and voice dissent. Thus, an unlikely alliance between the economic sectors and the 
religious leaders coalesced, smoldering under the apparently calm surface of a modernizing and 
urbanizing nation-state. 
PART I - THE WHITE REVOLUTION AND THE EFFECTS OF RAPID 
MODERNIZATION 
The Emerging Iranian-American Alliance
 After the ousting of Prime Minister Mossadeq in 1953, the Shah faced a disillusioned and 
disheartened Iranian public that questioned his political legitimacy to lead the nation. The coup 
d'état, operated and facilitated by  the American CIA and the British SIS, provided empirical 
evidence of the recurring Iranian fear of outside interference in their affairs, as noted by Matthew 
Axworthy. “The idea that everything that happened in Iranian politics was manipulated by  a 
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hidden foreign hand was again reinforced, fathering dozens of improbable conspiracy theories in 
later years.”1 Improbable or not, the message to the Iranians seemed quite clear: the Shah was 
willing to use his Western allies to his advantage, even if it meant going against  the will of his 
own people with the removal of a democratically elected Prime Minister. Emboldened by 
Western support, the Shah believed himself to be invincible to domestic Iranian concerns. 
Therefore, he was encouraged to pursue policies to fulfill his personal agenda without regard to 
the desires of his subjects; he was effectively ruling above the people. 
 The Iranian population was severely disappointed in the aftermath of Operation Ajax. 
With such powerful allies in the West, particularly  the United States, it is amazing that the 
Iranians were able to rally  and defeat the Shah a mere twenty-six years later. The Shah’s attitude 
toward his subjects had a definite patriarchal nature; he made policy  decisions without the 
consent of the people and never attempted to become a popular king. These policies “alienated 
many Iranians from the young Shah, making popular support for him in subsequent decades 
equivocal at best.”2  Desmond Harney, the first  Chairman of the Irano-British Chamber of 
Commerce, argues that the Iranian Revolution was different than past revolutions, stating that it 
was more than just  another coup d'état against some oppressive leader. In a lecture delivered in 
1980, Harney made an important distinction regarding the significance of the Iranian Revolution: 
“It was not the overthrow of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi alone: it was the destruction of a dynasty 
and of fifty years of Westernization.”3  Both the Shah and his father before him, Reza Shah 
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 2  Ibid., 238.
 3  Desmond Harney, “Some Explanations for the Iranian Revolution,” Asian Affairs 11, no. 2 (1 Jun 1980): 
135, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed 18 September, 2011). 
Pahlavi, supported first  by the British and then the American governments, pursued policies of 
rapid modernization which were inherently Western in scope. It is important to note that  when 
the traditional forces of Iran rejected the Shah in 1979, it was not simply a repudiation of his 
government. The end of the Shah’s reign and instillation of Ayatollah Khomeini represented the 
end of an era of Westernization in Iran. By rejecting both communism and capitalism, Khomeini 
captivated Iranians with his famous slogan: “Neither East nor West - Islamic Republic!”
 Throughout the 1960s, the Shah’s desires to modernize and industrialize Iran were met 
with enthusiasm in the United States by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. In the 
Foreign Relations of the United States volumes (hereafter referred to as FRUS), which contains 
documents from Presidential libraries, Departments of State and Defense, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency, amongst others, there are numerous references to the desires of a 
relationship between the United States and Iran. These appeals towards cooperation followed the 
United States’ Cold War policy of containment, which held that the most effective way of 
repelling Soviet influence would be to provide economic and military  aid to any country 
threatened by  potential communist aggression. William S. Gaud, a senior member of the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), stated this goal quite clearly when he 
wrote, “In the case of Greece and Iran, substantial amounts of U.S. development lending are 
projected...it should result in satisfactory  progress toward the goal of self-sustaining growth. 
Furthermore, by directing assistance to long-term development, we enhance the ability of these 
countries to assume a progressively  larger share of the joint  defense burden from their increased 
national product.”4  Clearly, Cold War considerations were paramount for the American 
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Foreign Relations of the United States, Kennedy Administration: Volume IX, Foreign Economic Policy,  http://
dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/frus/frus61-63ix/07_Section_7.html (accessed November 30, 2011).
government in determining foreign policy  decisions throughout the 1960s. The Kennedy 
administration wanted to build a strong alliance with Iran through extensive economic and 
military aid in order to stem the influence of the neighboring Soviet Union. By providing funds 
and encouraging social and economic development that would improve the well-being of the 
Iranian population, the Kennedy administration believed Iran would remain friendly  to American 
interests and would prevent Soviet access to the oil-rich Persian Gulf.
 Supported with vast amounts of funds for development by the United States beginning in 
1963, the Shah embarked on his extensive reform program known as the White Revolution. It 
was a vast, sweeping reform movement which touched all aspects of Iranian society: “This six-
point program called for land reform, nationalization of the forests, the sale of state-owned 
enterprises to private interests, electoral changes to enfranchise women and allow non-Muslims 
to hold office, profit-sharing in industry, and a literacy campaign across the nation.”5  John 
Stempel, the U.S. Foreign Service Officer who served as the deputy chief of the political section 
of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran from 1975-9, argues that the lack of political development in the 
White Revolution was a key consideration in this period and can provide an explanation for the 
impetus of the revolutionary movement. Economic reform was established in the absence of 
political reform, for the Shah was not willing to share power with any other political body: 
“becoming [politically] involved never was a viable option for dedicated dissidents.”6 The Shah 
believed that his vision for Iran’s future was ideal and convinced himself that there was no need 
for political engagement. The Shah was never a ruler who connected with his people. He simply 
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Extremism (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 2009), 128. 
 6  John D. Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution (Lexington, KY: Clark Publishing, 2009), 39.
ruled above them, oblivious to the wants and desires of the rapidly changing Iranian populace. 
Due to the encouragement stemming from his advisors, however, the Shah was persuaded to 
experiment with enabling political participation in order to entertain the concept of political 
participation, which he hoped would appease the discontented masses.
Party Politics in Pahlavi Iran
 In 1957, a two-party system was established. Eventually evolving into the Iran Novin 
Party, the Mellioun Party  was established as the pro-government party, with its counterpart 
available in the Mardom Party.7 However, these parties were not as engaged as political parties in 
Western governments. “In keeping with the monarch’s concept of the people as passive 
participants in the policy and decision making process, the political parties were considered 
merely a way of organizing opinion, not an institution of government.”8  The parties could 
propose ideas and opinions, but had no legislative authority to enact any  policies, for the Shah 
remained as the Iran’s absolute monarch. Indeed, this two party system was a short experiment. 
Beginning in 1973, faced with the growing concern that the country  needed to undergo political 
reforms in order to survive the worldwide economic depression, the Shah was advised to disband 
the two-party system. Instead, he established the Rastakhiz (Resurgence) Party in March 1975. 
This new, single party, was created to consolidate participation to one, manageable party that was 
to be solely loyal to the Shah. As would be expected, a government with one political party 
established to support the Shah did not appease the growing strength of the opposition 
movement. These moderate elements of the opposition felt marginalized by  this governmental 
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restructuring and were thus compelled to join more radical movements. An important theme of 
the Revolution is exemplified by this decision to disband political parties: as order and stability 
in the country increasingly  dissipated by the late 1970s, the Shah was unable to make clear, well-
reasoned concessions to appease the more moderate factions of the opposition. As desperation 
increased for these moderate dissidents, they were compelled to join the more radical 
revolutionaries organized by Ayatollah Khomeini. 
 Axworthy  analyzes another important consideration of political activity under the Shah’s 
rule, namely, the existence of communism in Iran. The Tudeh party, established in 1941, was a 
pro-communist, Marxist-leaning political party. Throughout the Second World War, Soviet troops 
occupied large areas of northern and western Iran. Indeed, at the end of the war, after the British 
and American troops had left Iran, the Soviets remained in Azerbaijan, which cultivated the 
growth of a strong Tudeh influence. Here, the Soviets “encouraged pro-Soviet secessionist 
movements in Azerbaijan...with the aim of re-creating there something like the old Russian 
sphere of influence of 1907-1914.”9 The Soviets were well received in these areas and were thus 
able to grow significantly  in importance and presence. “Under their [Soviet] protection....the 
Tudeh Party  formed student and labor committees, printed newspapers and books, recruited large 
numbers of professionals and government workers, and even penetrated the military.”10 
 Though the Soviets eventually left in May  1946, the Tudeh party continued to grow in 
Iranian society. Its members “took places in the government cabinet and helped to bring forward 
new labor laws, set maximum working hours, and established a minimum wage.”11  However, 
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after being charged with an attempted assassination of the Shah in 1949, the party was 
disbanded. Resentful Tudeh Party members were forced into silence, often through arrests, exile, 
and executions under order of the Shah. Regardless, the initial advancement of these Tudeh 
members proved important in the growing anti-Shah movement. “Their [communist 
intellectuals] tales of the glories of Stalin’s Soviet republic, and the magnificent future that 
awaited the Iranian and wider Middle Eastern masses once communist revolutions swept away 
oppressive and decadent capitalist regimes proved enormously appealing.”12  These Cold War 
considerations are an integral part of the global implications of the Iranian Revolution. Many 
themes grounded in Socialist-Marxist thought (e.g. land redistribution, creating a classless 
society, removing the capitalist economic model) would be adopted by Khomeini. Yet 
Khomeini’s adaptation was significantly  distinct in a decidedly anti-communist mold, for he 
believed it to be an unacceptably atheistic ideology.
 With the expulsion of the communists and the withdrawal of British presence in Iran after 
1953, the United States felt compelled to step in and provide Iran with economic, military, and 
civil assistance. The militaristic nature of the American-Iranian alliance was strengthened under 
Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidency. The FRUS volumes contain correspondence between the Shah 
and President Johnson in which this relationship  is clearly established. In a letter written to the 
Shah on January  2, 1964, President Johnson praised him for his implementation of the White 
Revolution. “In freeing the energies of Iran's peasantry and laborers, as well as the women, you 
have taken a difficult and courageous step. You have proven your faith and confidence in the 
Iranian people and your resistance to alien pressures. You will be misunderstood and you will be 
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maligned....But you will also be admired and loved by your people.”13 The Shah responded to 
President Johnson within five days. In his response, he outlined the promising developments in 
the Iranian infrastructure and increasing economic opportunities available after the first year of 
the White Revolution. He also offered caution, however, underscoring the danger that his 
burgeoning nation faced by outside threats.
A matter to which I wish, Mr. President, to call your attention is the 
danger which threatens this area of the world. I refer to the 
stockpiles of weapons of aggression in the possession of Egypt and 
the ever increasing delivery of offensive equipment to that country 
by the Soviet Union, designed to serve, overtly or under cover, as 
instruments of Egyptian intervention. . . . Egypt, in fact, has 
already prepared an "intervention force" of considerable size, 
equipped with long-range bombers, missiles, heavy troop transport 
planes, submarines, ships, and torpedo boats armed with missiles, 
so that if a ‘change’ should happen to occur in any Arab country 
and President Nasser be asked to ‘intervene’ he would willingly do 
so and let the world be faced with a fait accompli. I should perhaps 
add that even Iran does not seem to be too distant for his designs or 
immune from his subversive activities.14
He continued, lamenting on the inadequate size and technology of the Iranian military  to combat 
such threats. In his concluding remarks, he clearly stated the necessity for increased military 
support from the United States: “If our armed forces are to function effectively and to perform 
their alloted duties, and if Iran, a staunch and steadfast ally of the United States, is to play her 
full part in the changing political climate of the Middle East, then obviously, Mr. President, these 
shortages [in the Iranian military’s capabilities] have to be met.” 15
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about_state/history/vol_xxii/a.html (accessed December 1, 2011). 
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Foreign Relations of the United States, Johnson Administration, Volume XXII, Iran, http://www.state.gov/www/
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 15  Ibid.
 With the creation of the United States Agency for International Development in 1961 
under President John F. Kennedy, the American government allocated $107.2 million to Iran.16 
Clearly, this was a major contribution to Iran’s development. Stempel suggests, however, that a 
shift in the American-Iranian alliance occurred in 1964. Washington, which became increasingly 
involved in other world affairs, like the growing unrest  in Vietnam, “was basically unconcerned 
about the internal turmoil the changes [of the White Revolution] had induced. . . . American 
interest shifted away from the political ramifications of the Shah’s programs towards Iran’s 
potential as a strong ally  of the United States in the Persian Gulf area.”17 Stempel cites that in 
1977, at the peak of U.S. military sales to Iran, the Department of Defense Security Assistance 
Agency delivered $2,433 million to Iran, a spike from the already high expenditures of early 
1970s.18  The sudden obtainable capital provided to the Iranian government ironically 
compounded development, leading to political corruption, food shortages, and soaring inflation.
Economic Considerations 
 The main concern of the Tudeh dissidents was the Shah’s imposition of economic 
policies that were capitalist  and pro-Western in nature. The reforms of the White Revolution 
were problematic to other elements of traditional Iranian society  as well. The rapid economic 
changes without political liberalization directly threatened the traditionally strong hold of the 
bazaar on the Iranian economy. For centuries, the bazaar served a primary role in the 
development of the urban economy. “The bazaar includes the urban production of small goods, 
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traditional artisans, the traditional bank and trade system, and the wholesale trade.”19  More 
importantly, though, was the bazaar’s role as the community  center of the city. Mosques and 
religious schools (madrasas) were located in the bazaars as well. Thus, if the bazaaris were 
threatened, then the ulama (Islamic clergy) would be equally  threatened as well. The intertwined 
nature of this relationship  became more pronounced as leaders from both factions of the 
opposition united against their common foe, the Shah.
 In the early stages of the White Revolution, however, the threats facing the ulama and 
bazaaris were not yet realized by the wider Iranian populace. Indeed, some segments of Iranian 
society benefitted from the results of the White Revolution. The elite, Westernized classes that 
remained close allies to the Shah gained materially from the reforms, mainly through the profits 
from increased oil production. After the coup against Mossadeq in 1953, the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Corporation (renamed British Petroleum, or BP, in 1954) soon became the most integral source 
of funds for the Shah’s government. By the early  1970s, thanks to the vast expansion of 
government expenditure, the effects of the Shah’s programs were beginning to be realized. “Per 
capita income in Iran increased to two thousand dollars, a Third World high. The student 
population reached an estimated ten million. . . . the number of industries quadrupled. And tens 
of thousands of acres of farmland were redistributed to some three million peasant families.”20 
The visibly  successful effects of the White Revolution, notably the markedly increasing capacity 
of the oil industry and the improvements and developments of highways and roads, served as 
empirical evidence which represented the benefits of the reforms to the Shah.
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 Yet the benefits of the White Revolution were not equally  distributed amongst all 
members of Iranian society. Though the developing industries like coal, textiles, and the 
manufacture of motor vehicles promised new jobs and opportunities to the previously isolated 
Iranian farmers, Robin Wright notes that “massive migrations to the cities led to housing 
shortages and slums. Unemployment, corruption and inflation soared. The gap between the rich, 
epitomized by an elite corps of families surrounding the Pahlavis, and the poor, notably those 
still in rural sectors, grew wider.”21  Significant amounts of government money were spent on 
military expenditures and engineering projects rather than aiding the poor with housing 
assistance or other social services. “As in any other time of major change, the new often looked 
crass against the dignity of the old that  was being pushed aside.”22 After the worldwide recession 
of 1973, these disparities proved even larger. This uneven distribution of economic resources is 
critical to understanding the Iranian Revolution.
 Another consideration of the White Revolution was the explosion of Western 
involvement in Iranian affairs. In an article for the academic journal Social Research, Akbar 
Karbassian analyzes the phenomenon of Western companies setting up joint  ventures in Iran as 
the most popular means of foreign investment. “A law passed in 1954 protected and guaranteed 
all foreign investments, thus attracting many  international firms to almost every field of 
economic activity,” including an automobile industry created in 1966 to assemble British-made 
Hillman-Hunter cars to a steel mill in Isafhan constructed with the help of the Soviet Union.23 
Karbassian attacks the nationalization of the private sector undertaken by Khomeini’s 
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Revolutionary  government and is highly critical of the Islamic Republic’s management of the 
economy in the years following the Revolution. 
 The burgeoning private sector cultivated by  the Shah was responsible for many of the 
infrastructural improvements and the growth of industry. Additionally, national wealth 
skyrocketed during the 1960s and early 1970s as a result of the policies of the White Revolution. 
However, this new wealth was not without consequences. For example, traditional agricultural 
farmers increasingly lost their jobs due to changes in technology. Forced migrations into the 
crowded cities, especially Tehran, to search for nonexistent jobs became an unfortunate reality 
for thousands of Iranians. Also, the surge in inflation beginning in 1973 is an important factor, 
especially in relation to world affairs. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) was established in Iraq in January of 1961. Comprised of twelve developing nations, 
including Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates in the Middle East, 
OPEC strives to stabilize the price of oil in worldwide markets. Furious over the West’s 
assistance to Israel, which resulted in the failed campaign led by  Egypt and Syria in the Yom 
Kippur War of 1973, the Shah led the Middle Eastern member states in a decisive political 
decision: in 1973, these states acted independently of the non-Middle Eastern OPEC members 
states and established an embargo on the United States and Western Europe.24 In particular, the 
Shah demanded higher oil prices, because it was Iran’s biggest export, and its value had not kept 
pace with other internationally traded Iranian goods.25
 Despite these embargoes, more money pumped into the Iranian economy for 
development purposes and, curiously, a large amount of it went back to the West in return for 
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military equipment. In the mid-1970s “the Shah bought more Chieftain tanks from the UK than 
the British army owned, and the very latest F-14 fighters from the United States.”26  This 
spending, Axworthy argues, is a key to understanding how the bazaaris became embittered 
toward the West. The Iranian economy  was floundering due to the skyrocketing inflation caused 
by these military expenditures. Not wanting to entertain the notion that his misguided economic 
ventures were responsible for the rampant inflation and decaying economy, the Shah instead 
turned his attention to the traditional segments of the Iranian society. He accused the economic 
downturn on their traditional, “backward” practices.  
The Shah blamed small traders for the price rises [of rent, food, 
and other necessities caused by the out of control inflation rates] 
and sent gangs into the bazaars to arrest so-called profiteers and 
hoarders. Shops were closed down, two hundred fifty thousand 
fines were issued, and eight thousand shopkeepers were given 
prison sentences - none of which altered the underlying economic 
realities by one iota.27
Axworthy  accurately portrays the sense of apprehension and helplessness felt by the increasing 
majority  of Iranians who did not benefit from the Shah’s flirtation with the West. The glaring 
deterioration of Iran’s economy under the Shah angered these people, but more importantly 
concentrated their rage towards the financier and supporter of the Shah’s policies, the United 
States of America. 
The Intelligentsia and the Foundations of Revolution 
 Various academics and thinkers from numerous disciplines, many  of whom ironically 
earned their education in the West or from schools in Iran created with Western monies, 
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supported the opposition movement against the Shah. One of the notable writers from this time 
was prominent Iranian thinker Jalal Al-e-Ahmad. While not  quite a supporter of Marxism, he did 
actively support the nationalist program of Mossadeq and the National Front and was also 
against the rapid development and infusion of Westernized-capitalism occurring under the Shah’s 
reign. One of his most important contributions was the idea of gharbzadegi, which is popularly 
translated as “Westoxication” or “West-strikenness.” Gharbzadegi permeated Iranian society 
through discussions and a book published in 1962 under the same name. “This attacked the 
uncritical way in which Western ideas had been accepted, advocated, and taught in schools. The 
result...was the creation of a people and a culture that were neither genuinely Iranian nor 
properly  Western.”28 Axworthy points out that “[Al-e-Ahmad] translated Sarte and Camus into 
Persian, but his firm attachment to intellectual honesty and his search for an authentic way  to live 
did not borrow from anyone.”29 The influence of Al-e-Ahmad and gharbzadegi on the course of 
the revolution was momentous. The groundwork laid by  Al-e-Ahmad in the philosophical 
underpinnings of Iranian discontent until his death in 1969 would greatly  influence his students 
and future thinkers.
 One of these future thinkers was Dr. Ali Shari’ati. One of Al-e-Ahmad’s most prominent 
students, Shari’ati wrote prolifically  during this period and was clearly influenced by  the themes 
of gharbzadegi. In Man and Islam, a publication of a series of lectures delivered to different 
universities in Iran in the late 1960s and early  1970s, Shari’ati lectured on the nature of 
contemporary  human beings. Using a powerful and highly convincing reasoning backed by the 
philosophical postulations of Heidegger, Nietzsche, Descates, Sarte, Camus and others, Shari’ati 
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questioned the capacity  of the individual to come to terms with human nature. In a lecture titled 
“Modern Man and His Prisons,” Shari’ati posed a charged argument: “My  basic thesis is that, 
today’s man is generally incarcerated within a few prisons and naturally  he is a true human being 
only if he can liberate himself from these deterministic conditions.  What are these determinisms 
and how can man free himself from their grips?”30 
 In a dynamic explanation of human nature, he posed that “man is a three-dimensional 
being with three aptitudes; he is conscious of himself and the world, he can choose, and he can 
create,” and concluded that “in short, man is what nature, history, and society  make of him, and 
if we change the environment man will also change.”31  The calls to change mankind were 
especially appealing to the discontented Iranians under the Shah’s reform policies. Shari’ati held 
that modern man is capable of extraordinary accomplishments, especially in the fields of 
technology. Due to the growing inter-connectedness of the world, Shari’ati argued that the free-
thinkers of the world’s societies could become more aware of their society’s position in regards 
to the other, more developed nations and, in conclusion, could skip  a few cycles in historical 
development.  According to this theory, he writes, “we are now witnessing societies which were 
tent-dwellers or slaves...in Asia, Africa, and Latin America...but suddenly, by revolting against 
history, they leaped to the bourgeoisie stage.”32  Men could now be the shapers of their own 
societies, based on their exposure and knowledge of sociology, political philosophies and 
governance, and could therefore bring rapid change to the societies in which they lived.  
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 This jump  in historical cycle available to the various colonial societies altered the course 
of development seen in most Western countries. Iranian society, however, was not ready for the 
rapid modernization caused by the injection of Western ideas and petrodollars. Instead, Shari’ati 
argued that Iranians needed a much more gradual approach to modernization with more 
representation in the political process. He encouraged Iranians to realize this goal.
At this point man enters the stage of “Ithar;” a word that does not 
exist in any  other language. Here, man chooses someone else over 
himself; namely, a man sacrifices himself for others. It  is obvious 
that from among the two deaths - another person’s and his own - he 
has chosen his own death. . . . Thus every  man can free himself 
from the last prison [of self] - which is frightening and contains 
invisible walls - through the power of Ithar. It is a love which, 
beyond rationality and logic, invites us to negate and rebel against 
ourselves in order to work towards a goal or for the sake of others. 
It is in this stage that a free man is born, and this is the most 
exalting level of an Ensan. . . . in order to free himself from the 
prison of his self, as RadhaKrishnan states, ‘He needs religion and 
love.’33
He argued that humanity can free itself from the current social order in which it lives. Clearly, 
such an influential and enticing argument would appeal to the traditional Iranian workers who 
were pushed out of their jobs due to the rapid introduction of Western industries and technologies 
in Iran. By articulating the inherent ability  to overcome obstacles, to risk their well-being, and to 
ultimately  achieve the idealized state of “Ensaniat,” or humanity, anti-Shah Iranians were 
encouraged to take charge of their situation and become an “Ensan.” Axworthy  notes that, while 
not necessarily a Marxist, Shari’ati certainly  created a revolutionary mold for the idiosyncratic 
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Shi’a doctrine in a comparably  Marxist model. Imprisoned by the Shah in 1972 for his rhetoric, 
Shari’ati was eventually  released in 1975, but was kept under house arrest until permitted to 
leave the country for England, where he died in 1977. The alleged cause of death was a heart 
attack, although the always suspicious Iranian subconscious attributed his death to murder by 
SAVAK, the Shah’s security force.34 
 The growing number of economically destitute Iranians were highly  receptive to the 
ideologies established by men like Al-e-Ahmad and Shari’ati. However, it  is important to 
remember that no historical events occur in a vacuum; these ideologies fused together with the 
growing religious movement to bring about the end of the Shah’s regime in 1979. Mangol Bayat-
Philipp, a history professor at  Harvard University writing prior to the upheaval beginning in 
1978, argues that Shari’ati’s message is unique, for it “touches the raw nerve of some of those 
profoundly pious youths who are so eager to become ‘modern,’ and yet remain faithful to their 
traditional system of values and beliefs.”35 Shari’ati criticized the existing ulama, accusing them 
of limiting the application of Islam to exclude its laws from all aspects of society. Bayat-Philipp 
writes, “Islam...is an ideology for a social revolution. . . . [Shari’ati] sees renovated faith as part 
of the complete regeneration of society; whereas present conformism he scornfully rejects as 
only the symbol of general stagnation.”36 This renewed understanding of Islam was facilitated by 
Ayatollah Khomeini, the first leader of the Islamic Republic established in 1979. Perhaps the 
Shah’s government did not understand the highly organized mosque network that supported 
Khomeini’s rise to power. Maybe these government officials did not believe that the clerics, after 
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decades of asserting the incivility  and backwardness of the ulama, were even capable of 
mounting a serious resistance movement. They were wrong. With the proper economic stimuli, a 
soaring level of distrust in the government, and a defeated intellectual movement, the mosque 
network proved to be astonishingly efficient in distributing information, galvanizing resistance, 
and inciting demonstrations against the Shah. The multi-faceted opposition movement consisted 
of several factions, all vying for different concessions from the Shah. Ayatollah Khomeini, a 
relatively unknown cleric, emerged as the unlikely candidate around whom the opposition 
united.
PART II - THE RISE OF KHOMEINI: RESURGENT SHIISM 
Theological Origins: The Invocation of Shi’a Doctrine
 The imposition of a government directed under the auspices of Islam dramatically altered 
the balance of power in the Middle East. How did Ayatollah Khomeini emerge to overcome the 
strong influence of the West, notably the United States, and come to rule the new Islamic 
Republic? The vastly modernizing and Westernizing society created under the Shah sharply 
contrasted with everything for which the new Republic stood, particularly the liberalization of 
women and the reliance upon outside powers (e.g. the United States) for economic and military 
support. The religious character and composition of Iran is important to understand in order to 
comprehend the effectiveness of Khomeini’s sermons on the necessity of Islamic governance to 
counter the Shah’s reign. 
 The Shi’a doctrine developed differently than the Sunni during the origins of Islam in the 
seventh century due to disagreements in understanding the nature of succession of the Prophet 
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Muhammad’s Caliphate.37 Ali ibn Abi Talib was elected the fourth Caliph of Islam in 652 AD, 
but he was murdered in 661 by  rivals as he entered the mosque at Kufa to pray. While the Sunnis 
(which often translates as Orthodox Muslims) believed in the community selection or election of 
the next Caliph after Ali’s murder, a minority group of thinkers instead supported the notion of 
hereditary  spiritual leadership known as the Imamate. “The Imam is recipient  of spiritual and 
political pre-eminence by  virtue of possessing special grace, miraculous power and special 
knowledge.”38  These thinkers, the founders of Shi’a doctrine, believed that  Ali had an absolute 
right to spiritual leadership  which, after his murder, was inherited by his sons. Therefore, the 
Shi’a believed that Ali was not the fourth Caliph but, rather, the first Imam. Shi’a Muslims are a 
prominent minority, consisting of just about ten percent of the world’s Muslims.39  However, a 
large concentration of Shi’a Muslims constitute the Iranian and Iraqi populations, making them 
unique among the other Muslim countries in which Sunni Muslims dominate.
 Another significant  aspect of Shi’a doctrine utilized by the revolutionary forces is the 
theme of martyrdom. Hussain, the last surviving son of Ali, and his supporters advocated a 
hereditary  succession to the Caliphate. Hussain and his six hundred followers were besieged by  a 
much larger Umayyad force (those who supported the election of political leaders to the 
Caliphate) of 6,000 men at  Kerbala in 680. Hussain and his followers were slaughtered, and their 
martyrdom was a significant component to the establishment of Shi’a Islam. “The day of 
Kerbala, the 10th day  of the month of Muharram, is known as Ashura. . . . Among the Shi’a it is 
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a day of mourning and commemoration when certain groups parade the streets mortifying 
themselves with self-inflicted wounds as an expression of guilt for having abandoned Imam 
Hussain in his hour of need.”40 Ayatollah Khomeini capitalized on these Shi’a traditions during 
the revolutionary movement. Indeed, in a declaration issued on October 31, 1971, Khomeini 
stated that  “the greatest disaster that befell Islam was the usurpation of rule by  Mu’awiya from 
‘Ali (upon whom be peace), which caused the system of rule to lose its Islamic character entirely 
and to be replaced by  a monarchical regime.”41  By  invoking the massacre at Kerbala and the 
duty of honoring the martyrdom of Ali, he galvanized support amongst  both the religious and 
secular components of the opposition to topple the Shah, who he depicts as the last remaining 
vestiges of the initial corruption of Islam. 
 Before the Revolution, however, Khomeini dedicated his attention to developing the idea 
of an Islamic state. While always an advocate of the infallibility of Islam, he did not apply these 
concepts to government until his banishment from the country  in 1963. Islamic Government was 
the best known of Khomeini’s works. Published in Najaf, Iraq in early 1970, it originated from a 
series of lectures that were recorded and transcribed by  a student. A primary component of his 
arguments is that the fuqaha (religious scholars) have long been absent from holding any kind of 
executive power in Muslim countries which has, consequently, contributed to the decline of the 
preeminence of Islam in these lands.42 He begins by acknowledging that “Islamic government 
does not correspond to any  of the existing forms of government.” Yet, more importantly, was that 
“in Islam the legislative power and competence to establish laws belongs exclusively to God 
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Almighty.”43  He attacked the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States of America as 
representatives of governments that exist to pursue policies contrary  to the benefit of their 
people; according to Khomeini, their decisions were solely self-benefitting to the leaders of these 
governments. He thought that both the communist and capitalist models were condemnable 
because both do not utilize the laws of Islam.
 “It is the duty  of the Imams and the just fuqaha to use government institutions to execute 
divine law, establish the just Islamic order, and serve mankind.44  Khomeini continued, 
advocating that “blood must sometimes be shed,” invoking the legacies of the martyr Ali and his 
son, Imam Hussain. “This duty is particularly important under the present circumstances, for the 
imperialists, the oppressive and treacherous rulers, the Jews, the Christians, and materialists are 
all attempting to distort  the truths of Islam and lead the Muslims astray.”45  He also outlined 
instructions for his students in madrasas in cities such as Qom, Tabriz, and Tehran, to follow in 
their attempts to address the grievances of these misinformed governments. “You, the younger 
generation in the religious institution, must come fully to life and keep  the cause of God alive. 
Develop  and refine your thinking, and lay aside your concern with the minutiae and subtleties of 
the religious sciences, because that kind of concentration on petty  detail has kept  many of us 
from performing our more important duties.”46 By compelling the younger religious students to 
act by resurrecting Shi’a origins, and by reaffirming the idea that “blood must sometimes be 
shed,” he was advocating for the violent overthrow of the Shah. The Ayatollah’s bold 
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declamations are significant. It is important to note his advice to “lay  aside your concern...on 
petty detail[s].” Khomeini essentially stated that any differences in religious interpretations were 
inconsequential so long as the primary obstacle to progress, the Shah, remained in power. The 
Ayatollah’s strategy  of galvanizing support  from diverse elements against the Shah would 
become an extremely effective one as the revolutionary fervor spread during the late 1970s.
 Islam is unique amongst the world’s major monotheistic religions in the fact  that it  
ascribes laws and codes to govern the social and political spheres of life in addition to the 
religious: “It covers business deals and banking, hygiene, marriage and divorce, defense and 
taxes, penal codes, even family relationships.”47  The Shah’s reforms fundamentally uprooted 
several of these established cultural Iranian traditions, many of which drew upon Islam as their 
foundation. Particularly, the traditional role of Islam in the bazaaris’ business transactions 
became increasingly  removed from the new Iranian economic sector because of the rapid 
imposition of foreign investment and new industrialization. Many conservative, traditional 
Iranian thinkers believed that the reforms of the Shah directly  threatened the very nature of Islam 
itself. This very real threat mobilized many Iranian religious leaders, students, and scholars, yet 
they were often brutally repressed by the Shah through SAVAK. 
 SAVAK’s reputation of terror was not confined within Iran. Amnesty International’s (AI) 
Annual Report for 1974/1975 includes accounts of political repression and human rights 
violations worldwide. The report states, “the Shah of Iran retains his benevolent image despite 
the highest rate of death penalties in the world, no valid system of civilian courts and a history of 
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torture which is beyond belief.”48  In the Middle East particularly, it states that “the greatest 
causes of concern in the area [the Middle East] are the continuing high incidence of official and 
unofficial executions in Iran.”49  SAVAK regularly  tortured and murdered both secular and 
religious outspoken critics of the Shah’s reign throughout the 1970s. Politically, the Iranians 
could do nothing to change the policies of the Shah.  As the economic situation spiraled out of 
control in the late 1970s, however, not even the repression tactics of SAVAK could subdue the 
massive numbers of disaffected Iranians. As the economic realities became more dire, the 
moderate elements of the opposition became inexorably drawn to the radical, Shi’a 
fundamentalist teachings of the Ayatollah.
Khomeini Before Exile
 Robin Wright uncovers the background and motives of the first leader of the Islamic 
Republic in her book In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade. Ruhollah Khomeini was born 
in 1902 into a religiously powerful family: “both his grandfather and his father...were mullahs ‘of 
the Musavis’...a family  line that descended from the Prophet Mohammad. Such noble heritage 
entitled them to wear a black turban, rather than the white headgear of an ordinary cleric.”50 This 
black turban would eventually serve as a rallying sign to the dissenting masses. One must 
remember that during the hectic pre-revolutionary and revolutionary  years, the Ayatollah was not 
even in the country, for he was exiled in 1963 after publicly denouncing the Shah. How, then, 
was he able to amass such an organized and focused opposition force against the Shah’s reign? 
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 Khomeini was relatively unknown throughout a significant segment of his lifetime, even 
during the Revolutionary  years. As a teacher at the seminary in Qom, he was incredibly 
influential to his students, but this sphere of influence did not expand much beyond the 
boundaries of the seminary. Yet his activities against Iran’s path towards modernization date back 
to the first Pahlavi Shah. “By the 1930s, as Reza Shah was in the full throes of modernization, 
Khomeini had quietly but methodically begun campaigning to preserve beliefs long central to the 
Iranian way of life.”51  He underwent a rigorous education in ethics and philosophy in Qom. 
Axworthy  notes that he was unconventional when compared to the other Iranian mullahs. His 
interests in poetry and mysticism was frowned upon by more conservative mullahs.52 However, 
these idiosyncrasies did not diminish his following. “Khomeini had a strong sense of himself as 
well as the dignity of the ulema as a class.”53  This purpose and conviction certainly  inspired 
loyalty amongst his students in Qom in his early  years as a teacher. These initial years spent 
reading, writing, and teaching allowed Khomeini to formulate an ideology supported by an 
intellectual background. By the time he was made an Ayatollah in 1961, he had already 
established an intensely loyal, if at this point small, base of support.
 Many of the far-reaching reforms of the White Revolution were very Western-inspired 
and, hence, un-Islamic in nature. In Khomeini’s mind, the Shah’s platform posed a direct  threat 
to the cultural and religious foundation of Iran. Even the seemingly  smaller concerns, such as the 
banning of the veil and the adoption of Western dress, were troubling for Khomeini. In a series of 
sermons delivered from the Faziya Madrasa in Qom in March, 1963, the Ayatollah denounced 
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these reforms, emphasizing that the real purpose behind the White Revolution was to increase the 
Shah’s own wealth and to continue to intensify Iran’s subordinate relationship  with the United 
States. Indeed, during the celebrations marking the Iranian New Year in March, 1963, Khomeini 
issued a fatwa (religious promulgation) that condemned the White Revolution which inspired 
demonstrations of religious students across the country.54  
 Always fearful for potential enemies, the Shah did not want to let Khomeini’s public 
outcry  against his will go unchecked; the Shah’s paranoia over power-consolidation was 
particularly acute in the beginning years of the White Revolution. Khomeini’s fatwa and the 
objections of the other radical ulama threatened to prevent his desires to bring Iran to Western 
modernity. The Shah responded by  sending troops to Qom to suppress the demonstrations and to 
regain control of the city. Several students were killed and the madrasa was ransacked by the 
police in punishment for Khomeini’s excesses. On April 3, 1963, forty days after their deaths, 
Khomeini issued a declaration in commemoration of these students in which he questioned why 
they were killed. 
Our crime was defending the laws of Islam and the independence 
of Iran. It is because of our defense of Islam that we have been 
humiliated and brought to expect imprisonment, torture, and 
execution. Let this tyrannical regime perform whatever inhuman 
deed it wishes - let it break the arms and legs of our young men, let 
it chase our wounded from the hospitals, let it threaten us with 
death and the violation of our honor, let it destroy the institutions 
of religious learning, let it expel the doves of this Islamic sanctuary 
from their nests!55
He goes further, challenging the intentions and motives of the Pahlavi government. “I have 
repeatedly pointed out that the government has evil intentions. . . . the Ministry of Justice has 
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made clear its opposition to the ordinances of Islam by. . . the abolition of the requirement that 
judges be Muslim and male; henceforth, Jews, Christians, and the enemies of Islam and the 
Muslims are to decide on affairs concerning the honor and person of the Muslims.”56  He 
attempted to establish solidarity amongst others who feel oppressed due to the Shah’s reign and, 
indeed, to those proponents of Islam abroad, by  advocating demonstrations to remember these 
victims at Qom. “If they are not prevented by the agents of the government, they should hold 
ceremonies of mourning and curse those responsible for these atrocities.”57 
 One of the Ayatollah’s most famous declarations in the pre-revolutionary period was 
actually delivered at the Faziya Madrasa on June 3, 1963 in which he dictated, in highly  explicit 
language, his displeasure with the Shah’s regime. Referencing the murder of religious students, 
the sacking of the madrasa, and the subsequent destruction of the Qur’ans, Khomeini is lead to 
conclude “that this regime also has a more basic aim: they are fundamentally opposed to Islam 
itself and the existence of the religious class.58 This infamous sermon was most notable for its 
direct attack on the character of the Shah himself. He addressed the Shah’s courtship with the 
West, arguing that the material wealth gained from his reforms was highly superficial and 
purported that  Washington was using the Shah for its own benefits. He invoked a historical 
precedence established by the Shah’s father, Reza Shah, reminding the public that the first 
Pahalvi was forced to abdicate the throne to his son by the Allied powers near the end of the 
second World War due to his amicable relationship with the Germans. Khomeini urged the Shah 
to recognize his father’s mistakes and to abandon his dependence on the West.
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Shah, I don’t wish the same to happen to you; I don’t want you to 
become like your father. Listen to my advice, listen to the ‘ulama 
of Islam. . . . You miserable wretch, forty-five years of your life 
have passed; isn’t it time for you to think and reflect a little, to 
ponder about where all this is leading you, to learn a lesson from 
the experience of your father. . . . Why do you speak without 
thinking? Are the religious scholars really some form of impure 
animal? If they are impure animals, why do the people kiss their 
hands? Why  do they regard the very water they drink as blessed? 
Are we really  impure animals? I hope to God that you did not have 
in mind the ‘ulama and the religious scholars when you said, ‘The 
reactionaries are like an impure animal,’ because if you did, it will 
be difficult for us to tolerate you much longer, and you will find 
yourself in a predicament. You won’t be able to go on living; the 
nation will not allow you to continue this way. . . . I feel anxiety 
and sorrow at the state of Iran, at the state of our ruined country, at 
the state this cabinet, at the state of those running our government. 
I pray to God Almighty that He remedy our affairs.59
Until this declamation, no one dared to speak against the Shah’s oppressive regime, especially 
with such bold denunciation of his character, for fear of violent retaliation. The Ayatollah 
capitalized on the growing repression felt by the ulama. He hoped to spur revolt amongst the 
religious class against the Shah’s oppressive rule. The significance of the June 3 sermon is also 
demonstrated by  its inherent foreshadowing. By  the end of the 1970s, the Shah would come to 
find himself in a very serious “predicament” indeed. Khomeini’s calls to the “commanders of the 
great Iranian army, its respectable officers, and its noble members” to join him for the “salvation 
of Islam and Iran” were unacceptable to the Shah; Khomeini and some of his key supporters 
were arrested on June 4, 1963.
 After spending ten months in prison, Khomeini was sentenced to exile. His aggressive 
discourse and contrary  viewpoints could not be allowed to circulate amongst the masses, 
considering the Shah’s goals of Westernizing Iran and loosening the grip older traditions and the 
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ulama had on the nation. Khomeini’s exile, first in Turkey, then Iraq, and ending in Paris, would 
last for over a decade until his triumphant return to Iran in February 1979. Wright offers an 
interesting opinion when she states that it was the Shah who, in a sense, “made” Khomeini. 
Throughout his life thus far, he had often been eclipsed by other religious and secular leaders of 
greater scholarship or with more numerous followers. “First, his initial arrest created public 
appeal and drew attention to his agenda. Second, the Shah simultaneously  alienated even those 
clergy who disagreed with Khomeini by ignoring the traditional internal balance of power [by 
exiling him].”60  By  sentencing him to exile, the Shah inadvertently  ascribed a certain celebrity 
status to Khomeini. The Shah’s censorship worked against  him, for Khomeini’s exile established 
a degree of mystique around this unknown Ayatollah, making him a controversial and alluring 
figure.   
 While physically exiled from the country, Khomeini was never ideologically far from the 
emerging revolutionary  scene in Iran. New technological inventions, like the tape recorder, 
allowed his messages and sermons to be smuggled from Iraq into Iran. His continued work while 
abroad allowed him to build his support base and sharpen the general discontent with the Shah 
into a detailed reproach of his policies. His capacity as a Shi’a jurist enabled him to develop  a 
practical and accessible platform on which to appeal to the ordinary Iranians. In this endeavor, 
the intricacies of Shi’a doctrine proved particularly useful. Political scientist Fred Halliday 
argues that there were two notable ideological themes in popular Shiism which were exploited 
for political advantage. The first was the idea of martyrdom, as evidenced in the passion plays 
celebrated every year in Iran commemorating the death of Hussain in the seventh century.  
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 The second more significant theme was the Shi’a belief that at some point in the future 
the Twelfth Imam would descend to the earth, creating a just society under which all would 
prosper. This prospect of a perfect society galvanized support amongst Iranians who hoped that 
the Islamic Revolution would indeed fulfill this prophecy. Yet Khomeini, ever the cunning 
politician, knew that  he needed total support of the masses in order to bring the Shah’s reign to 
an end; ambiguous goals would thus be necessary  to ensure over-arching support. While 
advocating for a government run under the auspices of Islam, “he realized that his greatest asset 
was to have nothing to do with the Shah’s regime, and he kept his intentions for the future 
regime as vague as possible in order to maximize political support.”61 Halliday has uncovered a 
critical component of Khomeini’s character, going so far as praising him as the “epitome of a 
charismatic leader.” By never promising specifics, he protected himself from future attacks after 
the implementation of the Islamic Republic. With the unintentional assistance of the Shah, 
Khomeini had begun to lay the groundwork for his ultimate takeover of Iran: he had emerged as 
the mouthpiece for the discontented, conservative mullahs. By the mid-1970s, however, the Shah 
had certainly created many more enemies for himself than this one segment of Iranian society,. 
Each segment had its own leaders, representatives, and demands. How did Khomeini, who was 
in exile throughout the Shah’s rapid decline, emerge as the unifying figure of the entire 
opposition movement? 
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PART III - THE SPARK: 1977-1979
Savak Brutality
 Despite the growing dissent fueled by  the exiled Khomeini in the late 1960s, public 
demonstrations against the Shah were limited. Political participation for the opposition was non-
existent due in large part to the brutal repression of the Shah’s secret police force, SAVAK. 
SAVAK’s repression underscored the notion that, politically, those who opposed the Shah could 
do nothing to affect the regime. In an attempt to quell the emerging unrest in 1977 and to appease 
the vaunted human rights program of the new U.S. President, Jimmy Carter, the Shah allegedly 
changed SAVAK’s policies to discontinue the use of torture. The ambiguity  and arbitrary natures 
of the changes fooled no one: “every Iranian. . . from the lowest paid civil servant to the highest 
ranking parliamentarian. . . knew that the security services were not truly under the control of the 
government officials supervising them, but actually doing the Shah’s bidding. . . . [they were] 
beyond the law.”62 Not all accusations of SAVAK treachery were valid; several instances were 
fabricated and used as anti-Shah propaganda. Still, SAVAK culpability  was resurrected 
continuously throughout the Revolution, for the organization was guilty of several counts of 
human rights violations.  
 Amnesty International’s 1974/1975 Annual Report provides insight on some of these 
political prisoners who suffered under SAVAK brutality. In April 1975, AI reported that nine 
political prisoners were shot while allegedly trying to escape: “The men were known to have 
been among 114 political prisoners who had been moved to Evin prison at the beginning of 
March 1975, and reports of their torture had reached AI from that time.”63  AI cites the total 
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number of political prisoners reported throughout the year “to be anything from 25,000 to 
100,000 but AI is not able to make any  reliable estimate.”64 In a Special Report printed in 1980 
by The Nation, a weekly magazine in the United States, the abuses of SAVAK were brought to 
light in terrifying clarity. The unveiling of documents and photographs taken from SAVAK’s files 
after the Islamic takeover revealed the abuses of SAVAK and shook the United States’ support of 
their deposed ally. The reporter Reza Baraheni recounts his journeys to some of the hidden 
torture chambers that  were built adjacent to the University  of Tehran: “Some of the torture 
instruments were still there when I visited two of those stations on the second day of the 
revolution. A mysterious interrogation center right in the heart of the city had underground canals 
lit  with dim electric lights leading to cells in which rotting pieces of human flesh were still 
clinging to the torture instruments.”65 
 Baraheni provides more insight into the deaths of the political prisoners in the Evin 
prison for, in the autopsy reports in possession of The Nation, there is an account of the death of 
fifty  prominent political prisoners in April 1975, a much larger statistic than the nine that was 
conservatively estimated by Amnesty International five years prior. These reports “ascribe death 
to bullet wounds sustained while the victims were attempting to ‘escape.’ And most of these 
bullet wounds are found in the chest and forehead - which would lead an independent observer to 
conclude that these people were executed before a firing squad.”66  Baraheni continues, 
addressing the Shah’s poor attempts to cover up SAVAK’s activities:
 34
 64  Ibid., 129.
 65  Reza Baraheni, “The SAVAK Documents,” The Nation, February 23, 1980, 198, Academic Search 
Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed 23 October, 2011).
 66  Ibid.,199. 
In a recent TV interview with David Frost, the deposed Shah of 
Iran claimed that he had not been aware of the torture of political 
prisoners in his country during his long reign. Since he had no 
knowledge of torture, he plaintively asked, how could he be held 
culpable for what went on in his prisons? But the Shah 
immediately contradicted himself by saying that his henchmen 
stopped torturing people in 1976.  By  this admission, the Shah is 
responsible for more than thirty years of systematic torture.67
The Shah was unable to separate himself from the excesses of his security forces. As his grip  on 
the nation spiraled out of control, his feeble attempts at conciliation with the opposition were 
seen as untrustworthy.  
 The Shah’s abrupt change in policy can only be understood within the context of 
pervasive economic instability  and the Shah’s failure to address legitimate demands for greater 
political participation.  After the OPEC embargo of 1973, the Iranian government increasingly 
lost control of the economy. Dizzying inflation and the subsequent job losses were felt 
particularly by the poor, though, on a smaller degree, by all sectors of Iranian society. “Rents 
were high for the middle-class engineers, managers, and professionals in Tehran, and those with 
a stake in new businesses felt the impact of deflation acutely.”68 Academic Mohsen Milani draws 
a parallel to the French Revolution, arguing that it was poor economic planning that precipitated 
the coming revolution. “The infusion of the petrodollar had enlarged the size of the entrepreneur 
class and the state bureaucracy  to such an extent that effective control of them had become an 
impossible task.”69 Milani concludes that the Shah’s remedies to control the economic crisis were 
more political in nature rather than based on sound economic reasoning.
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 There was a three-fold effect of this “populist turn” of the government’s intervention in 
economic affairs: “to enlarge the regime’s popular base of support by granting concessions to the 
lower classes and distributing the oil wealth more equitably; to lower rampant inflation; and to 
exculpate the regime of any wrongdoing by identifying the merchants, the shopkeepers, and the 
industrialists as the principal cause of the economic chaos.”70 Demonizing these shopkeepers and 
the bazaar turned out to be highly  ineffective. Funded by the bazaaris, Khomeini and his 
network of mullahs disseminated copies of his sermons throughout the mosques in the bazaars. 
The discontented urban poor, with no means to politically advocate for their beliefs, were 
relegated to these mosques and further exposed to Khomeini’s revolutionary viewpoints. The 
Shah’s attempt to cast blame on these mosque-goers therefore seemed petty, a ploy by a 
desperate autocrat who was rapidly losing control of his country.
Qom & Tabriz: Catalyst to Revolution 
 Stempel asserts that the riots in Qom and Tabriz in early 1978 signified the beginning of 
the Revolution. These riots represented a fusion of the various facets of the opposition movement 
into a unified entity  directed by the ulama. A newspaper article published on January 5 by 
Etlela’at, Iran’s oldest newspaper which was under strict  censorship by the Shah’s government, 
attacked Khomeini, suggesting that he was a homosexual and branding him as the instigator of 
the “anti-national” riots in Qom after his famous declaration in June, 1963. On January 7, 1978, 
enraged Shiite religious leaders instigated demonstrations against the government. After a strong 
anti-government sermon, “approximately  5,000 people left. . . the main mosque [in Qom]. . . to 
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march towards Ayatollah Shariatmadari’s home.”71  Shariatmadari was a moderate and often 
disagreed with Khomeini, yet his calls for restraint  and caution when dealing with the Shah were 
increasingly  ignored. When the police were called to break up the demonstration in Qom, the 
officer in charge “ordered his men to fire their weapons.”72 A significant aspect of the revolution, 
concerning the accuracy of casualty  reports, manifested itself in this riot. While the opposition 
leaders claimed thirty killed and over 200 injured, the official Par News Agency account offered 
that six died, including one child. Whose accounts were to be accepted as accurate? “More 
importantly, two mullahs were among the dead and their blood-soaked turbans were posted 
above the entry gate to the main mosque.”73  Thus, the martyrdom of Shi’a doctrine was 
beginning to be realized. The death of the mullahs gave the religious members of the opposition 
a “rallying cry” for the masses. 
 As dictated by Shiite custom, mourning ceremonies are held forty days after a death 
occurs. In accordance with this custom, demonstrations for the “martyrs of Qom” (a title given 
by the opposition) were scheduled throughout Iran for February 18. Khomeini, still in exile in 
Najaf, Iraq, issued a declaration entitled In Commemoration of the First Martyrs of the 
Revolution to honor those victims. Khomeini attributed these deaths not to the police who fired 
on the martyrs, but  to the Shah himself. “Do you think it is the police chief of Qom who does 
these things? Don’t say it is the police who do these things; it is the Shah! The Shah personally 
gives the orders and tells them to kill. . . . It is the Shah who determines everything; he is the real 
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criminal.”74  It is doubtful that  the Shah specifically  ordered the police to shoot down these 
protestors in Qom. Nevertheless, overwhelming anger and distrust of the Shah’s regime had 
begun to seriously  manifest  itself, and Khomeini’s explanations were well-received because the 
Shah’s policies were viewed as increasingly arbitrary and illogical. Khomeini continued, 
attacking the prevalence of outside forces in Iranian affairs.
Before it was the British that brought us misfortune; now it is the 
Soviets on the one hand, and the Americans on the other. All our 
miseries are caused by those imperialists; if they would stop 
protecting the Iranian government, the people would skin them 
alive. . . . That is our problem - everything in our treasury has to be 
emptied into the pockets of America, and if there is any slight 
remainder, it has to go to the Shah and his gang. They buy 
themselves villas abroad and stuff their bank accounts with the 
people’s money, while the nation subsists in poverty.75
Here, Khomeini called on the large number of disillusioned Iranians in order to build popular 
support for his plans for a new Iran. By blaming the nation’s problems on America and the 
Shah’s repressive and incompetent leadership, he ensured that his message would resonate 
throughout the country. Even Iranians who traditionally opposed or were otherwise apathetic 
towards the ulama soon became enthralled with their revolutionary ideas. The opposition had 
begun to mobilize, spurred on by the persuasive Ayatollah.
 The very day that  Khomeini offered this commemoration, another notable riot occurred. 
Tabriz, a city particularly affected by the recession, witnessed the next round of casualties on the 
road to revolution. The provincial government of the city shut down the mosques on the day of 
the protests marking the fortieth day  commemoration of the Qom riots. This incited angry 
demonstrations outside the mosques in the bazaar where the protestors demanded entry. Again, 
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details concerning the origins of the day’s violence are unsubstantiated.76 Regardless, when the 
rioting broke out, it took on a markedly new shape which foreshadowed the events to come.
This was the first conflagration to mobilize the masses of youth 
and urban poor for economic as well as religious reasons. . . . The 
pattern of violence - destruction of banks, restaurants, liquor stores, 
hairdressing establishments, and government buildings, all 
symbols of modern Iran - strongly suggests both efficient 
leadership and a very conservative religious orientation among the 
rioters.77
By rousing the urban poor into action, it is clear that, even in these initial stages of the 
revolutionary  uprising, Khomeini’s message had spread beyond a few radical ulama. The 
various social and economic classes that would come to participate in the revolution 
demonstrates the universal nature of the revolution; it was not  simply a coup initiated by a few 
influential radicals. Another key  component of these riots at Qom and Tabriz was the 
government’s complete failure in handling the situation in a peaceful manner. The Shah’s police 
forces were woefully  unprepared for riot control. Their mismanagement of the riots only 
escalated the violence. The government claimed that “Islamic Marxists” and “foreign elements” 
were responsible for these riots; again, this weak attempt to appoint the blame only emboldened 
the opposition.
 The Shah was forced to respond to the emerging discontent by attempting to appease 
these resistors through reforming military court procedures and releasing some political 
prisoners. Clearly, the Shah wanted to compromise with the moderate elements of the opposition 
in order to isolate the extremist segments. But these concessions were coming too late. Indeed, 
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these reforms backfired, for the concessions angered the base of the Shah’s loyal supporters as 
well. They thought that opening politics to the opposition was both dangerous and an insult to 
their years of loyalty to the Pahlavi dynasty. Stempel documents the complaints of one of these 
pro-Shah government officials: “Are we, the technocrats who built modern Iran, now to be 
sacrificed to its critics? The government has proved incapable of restoring order - wouldn’t the 
best policy  be to tighten up  the government? We know who these radicals are. They are 
Mossadeqists [referencing supporters of the nationalist Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq 
overthrown by  the CIA in 1953], religious fanatics, and leftists bent on destroying us. They 
should be destroyed, not appeased.”78  After Prime Minister Amouzegar’s insistence on more 
political participation, the Shah eventually  acquiesced. Amouzegar replaced the Resurgence 
Party’s secretary  general, Mohammad Baheri, and personally directed the party’s policies 
beginning in December, 1977. This major upheaval confused the traditionally present, if weak, 
support of the Resurgence Party. Baheri’s surrender to the government further demonized the 
Shah in the eyes of the Iranians. By accepting the power from the Shah, the Resurgence Party’s 
credibility was destroyed. The loss of the Resurgence Party  disenchanted even the most idealistic 
political participants who still believed that the Shah’s government would legitimately 
acknowledge their concerns.79
 Then, there was the tragedy of Abadan. On August  19, 1978, the Rex Cinema in Abadan 
was burned to the ground, killing 430 people. The nature of the blaze indicates that it was not 
accidental: “An official investigation showed the walls had been soaked with gasoline and the 
fire started with a battery-operated timing device. The one entry and exit door had been locked, 
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and police and fire-fighting equipment were late in arriving. An overwhelming majority of the 
people inside the burning building died very quickly  from suffocation, not from burns.”80 The 
opposition claimed the blaze was started by  SAVAK in order to kill Mujahidin (literally “people 
doing jihad”) who were watching the film, while the government claimed radical Islamists were 
to blame. Due to the escalating crisis in Iran, an official investigation was never fully conducted, 
yet the government’s explanations certainly seem dubious at best. Stempel reports that the police 
station, located a mere 300 yards from the Cinema, had taken “almost an hour to send anyone 
around to check. Two hours after the incident was first  reported the city  fire brigade arrived, and 
the more modern fire fighting equipment available through the nearby National Iranian Oil 
Company refinery was never even requested.”81 These details, coupled with the existing depth of 
mistrust in the opposition, enabled many to connect this event to SAVAK.
Collapse: Black Friday 
 Echoing his pattern of ineffectual decision-making, the Shah made a serious mistake 
when he underestimated the strength of the religious opposition. In early 1978, the Shah 
approved two newspaper articles that attacked Ayatollah Khomeini as “the symbol of black 
reaction, an agent of colonialism, and a traitor of non-Persian dissent.”82 Demonstrations erupted 
in Qom in which police fired on students, killing several. Khomeini praised the strength, 
courage, and devotion of these martyrs from afar, encouraging the opposition to remain strong in 
their conviction and demonstrations against the Shah’s reign. The final tipping point, however, 
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was yet to come. On September 8, now known as “Black Friday,” the police fired upon a largely 
peaceful gathering in Jaleh Square in the center of Tehran to protest the Shah’s imposition of 
martial law in late August. The moderate Ayatollah Shariatmadari counseled caution; he did not 
want direct confrontation with the Shah’s forces under the martial law situation in Tehran. These 
fears were echoed by National Front Leadership as well, for they  did not want to lose their 
supporters to the Shah’s brutal repression tactics.83 These fears did not sway the other opposition 
leaders, for the radical ulama, supported by Khomeini who was now in France, received the 
declaration from Khomeini himself to go forth and confront the government.
 At 7:30 in the morning on Friday, September 8, the army  commander present at Jaleh 
Square ordered the assembled protesters to disperse; they refused. “The army units at  Jaleh 
Square let loose with several volleys, killing around 100 people in the initial 
fusillade...eyewitnesses confirmed that there was shooting from helicopter gunships.”84  At the 
end of the day, several opposition leaders were taken into custody, including Mehdi Bazargan, 
the leader of the Liberation Movement which had ties to the National Front, and several 
Ayatollahs, only to be released two hours later.85 These arbitrary  arrests and immediate releases 
from prison further emphasize the inherent confusion in the Shah’s government. He simply  did 
not know how to effectively confront the opposition in a way  that would quell the rebellion. This 
was clearly  evident in the weeks following the showdown at Jaleh square with the dissolution of 
the Resurgence Party on September 30. What little loyalists remained now had no formal 
political structure in order to mobilize support for the Shah. In the particularly volatile urban 
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centers, the Liberation Movement, the Fedayeen (an early  Islamic fundamentalist movement), 
and the Mujahidin soldiers were able to “propagandize striking workers and migrants from the 
hinterland...[while] the National Front concentrated on influencing members of the middle class 
to defect.”86 The members of the blossoming Iranian middle class that was inducted by  the Shah 
were now turning against him, joining the dissidents. Why? These educated dissidents could not 
politically  engage the Shah and were, thus, unwillingly forced to join Khomeini’s supporters as 
the only alternative to bring change to Iran. As the opposition increased, both in numbers and 
diversity of opinion, a critical point must be established: while the entirety of opposition was 
unified in their resistance to the Shah for some reason or another, there were many facets of the 
opposition that were ambiguous in their attitudes towards Khomeini.
 The opposition was now effectively unified under the direction of the ulama. Khomeini 
issued another condemnation of the military crackdown on the fortieth day  anniversary of Black 
Friday, October 11, 1978. “Now that the sinister specter of military  government has added its 
dark shadow to the darkness of monarchy and inflicted further misery on our deprived 
people...our country sits mourning without any protector.”87  Axworthy comments on this 
tradition of a forty day mourning period between government atrocities, which would cyclically 
erupt in new protests as each period reached its end. “Like a great revolutionary lung,” he writes, 
“the demonstrations grew larger and more violent, with slogans like ‘death to the Shah.’”88 
Military leaders, several of them in senior ranking positions, began to desert. Indeed, several 
officers directed their forces not to interfere further with the demonstrations. Such degradation in 
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the military forced Prime Minister Jafar Sharif-Emami to resign from his post. He was replaced 
by Gholam Reza Azhari, who served for the tumultuous last fourteen months of the Shah’s reign. 
  On November 6, the Shah recognized the legitimacy of the uprising in a nationally 
televised speech in which he seemingly  sympathized with the revolutionary forces. “Once again 
before the Iranian people I swear that I will not repeat  the past mistakes and I assure you that 
previous mistakes, lawlessness, oppression, and corruption will not happen again. . . . I, too, have 
heard the voice of your Revolution.”89 His calls to prosecute the corrupt were acted upon by the 
Azhari government: “two days later, former Prime Minister (for 14 years) Hoveyda and 14 other 
major figures were arrested. . . includ[ing] the former chief of SAVAK, Nematollah Nassiri, [and] 
two former provincial governors.”90  He had hoped that these arrests would appease the masses 
and demonstrate his desire to purge corruption from his government. The arrests, in fact, had an 
opposite effect. Other loyal Pahlavi supporters were outraged with the Shah’s decisions, leading 
many of his few remaining allies to abandon the Shah in disgust. 
 The demonstrations in late December 1978 showed a degree of unity and determination 
that shocked the Shah and his few remaining supporters: “In the crowd were men and women 
from all walks of life, young and old, rich and poor, educated and illiterate, students, teachers, 
professionals, the bazaaris, workers, government employees, and many more - a testimony to the 
multi-class essence of the revolutionary  movement.”91 The Shah realized that fleeing the country 
was his only option and left  on January 16, 1979. On February 1, Khomeini returned to Iran for 
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the first time in more than fifteen years, welcomed by a sea of supporters at the Mehrabad 
Airport in Tehran. He gave thanks to the multiple classes that enabled this victory over the Shah:
You have accomplished the first step toward a complete victory  by 
removing Muhammad Riza, the chief traitor, from the scene. . . . 
Our triumph will come when all forms of foreign control have 
been brought to an end and all roots of the monarchy  have been 
plucked out of the soil of our land. . . . Victory has been attained by 
the unity of purpose not only  of the Muslims, but also of the 
religious minorities, and by the unity of the religious leaders and 
the politicians. Unity of purpose is the secret of victory. Let us not 
lose this secret by  permitting demons in human form to create 
dissension in our ranks.92
Khomeini understood that victory was still not complete so long as the few Shah supporters 
remained. Upon his return to Iran, Khomeini met with Mehdi Bazargan, a leading member of the 
National Front, to draft the Revolutionary Council which would eventually supplant the 
remaining vestiges of the Shah’s monarchical government. Bazargan was eventually  appointed as 
the first Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic.
 During this planning stage, Khomeini acted as a cunning politician. He kept his promises 
for the new Islamic Republic purposefully vague, therefore guaranteeing support from the 
various factions of dissent. In many ways, the Iranian Revolution was a revolution against the 
Shah, not for Khomeini. “Among the secular and middle-class forces many hoped that once the 
Shah had gone they could deflect the movement away from its clerical patrons. This enabled 
such people to support  the movement with appropriate optimism, but it represented an 
underestimation of the strength of the religious forces.”93  The bazaaris, for example, were a 
prime representation of the secular forces that became apprehensive bedfellows with the ulama. 
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The explosive triangular relationship  between the urban poor and the bazaaris, facilitated 
through the ulama, enabled an effective revolutionary association. The ulama were thus able to 
reach the growing urban poor through their bazaari contacts in a way to address the secular 
concerns, leading Halliday  to conclude that  “the Iranian Revolution has more in common with 
other societies than the specifically religious dimension will permit.”94 The undefined nature of 
Khomeini’s intentions, when revealed, would alienate many who enabled his rise to power.
PART IV - ISLAMIC REPUBLIC REALIZED: 1979
 There was still much to be done before the Islamic Republic could be realized due in 
large part to the remnants of the Shah’s government. Previous National Front Leader, and 
prisoner under the Shah’s reign, Shapur Bakhtiar was announced Prime Minister by  the Shah just 
days before his final exile from the country. Bakhtiar’s government was deemed illegal by 
Khomeini on his return from exile. Khomeini urged civil servants and soldiers in the military to 
abandon Bakhtiar and work solely for Khomeini and his appointees to the various ministerships. 
A small segment of the Imperial Guard, 800 of 8,000 soldiers, stood loyal to Bakhtiar when 
Khomeini’s forces took over two large military instillations in Tehran on February 9. The 
following day, this military  leadership surrendered, which caused an abrupt  collapse of the armed 
forces. Bakhtiar disappeared, and Khomeini officially took over on February 12.95
 On February  5, when Khomeini was confident that Bakhtiar would be overthrown, he 
appointed Mehdi Bazargan Prime Minister of the new Islamic Republic. With the help of 
Bazargan, Khomeini established Revolutionary  Committees, or Komitehs, across Iran to 
 46
 94  Ibid., 206. 
 95  Stempel, 173.
cooperate with military deserters, Tudeh party  officials, and other opposition forces to attack the 
remaining vestiges of the Shah’s government. In the initial stages of Khomeini’s reign, it 
appeared that a balance might be struck between the more secular elements of the opposition 
forces and the ulama. This proved to be false. These Komitehs rounded up  remaining Pahlavi 
supporters and SAVAK leaders, executing them without trial.
 Khomeini orchestrated a bureaucracy that was thoroughly  Islamic, which was especially 
clear in the creation of the twelve-member Council of the Guardians. Six theologians were 
appointed by  Khomeini, and six by  the Parliament, although this body had total veto power over 
the Parliament. This body  was further superseded, for the real leadership  was transferred to the 
faqih, or Supreme Jurisprudent, which consisted of three to five ayatollahs. The faqih was “all 
powerful. . . [it had] appointment powers...over the judiciary, the military and the Council of 
Guardians. . . [and] de facto veto power over candidates running for virtually  any office and the 
right to dismiss the president.”96  Further, by monopolizing the judicial branch, Khomeini was 
able to reintroduce Shari’a Law as the fundamental legal system for the new Republic. 
Khomeini’s autocratic wielding of power as the undisputed ruler of the opposition dashed the 
hopes of the secular and moderate facets of the opposition.  
 Milani states that there were five broad political groups in Iran vying for power after the 
ousting of the Shah: the secular/liberal nationalists, represented by  the National Front; Islamic/
liberal nationalists, represented by the Freedom Movement; the Islamic socialists, represented by 
the Mujahidin; the Shi’a Fundamentalists, represented by  Khomeini and his advisors whom 
orchestrated the Islamic Republic; and the secular left, represented by the Marxists. Milani holds 
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that Khomeini was “the personification of the Revolution, a mystical sage, a national hero, the 
savior of Iran and Islam. He was revered and idolized, at least in public, by fundamentalists, 
moderates, and leftists.”97  The Ayatollah was therefore able to directly  influence Bazargan. By 
wedding Bazargan (an ex-leader of the National Front) to the Islamic cause, Khomeini was able 
to essentially neutralize the secular/liberal nationalists. If Bazargan’s government attempted 
something against Khomeini’s blessing, he could easily have him removed just as he had 
Bakhitar removed before him.98
 The Ayatollah dominated the opposition groups, allowing the radical outlook of his close 
allies to establish the new Republic and to control the drafting of the Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic in December 1979. The Constitution dealt primarily with what the ulama believed were 
the economic injustices perpetrated by the Shah’s modernization policies. They desired to 
remove the vestiges of capitalism from Iran, and to denounce those Shi’ia jurists who attempted 
to justify the wealth that was accumulated during the reign of the Shah. Karbassian writes about 
the short-sightedness of these policies. “The left-leaning Islamists, however, sought to destroy 
what they considered to be remnants of trade capitalism...[instead] aspiring to establish a 
classless socialist Islamic state.”99 The Constitution determined that “all property that had been 
acquired by ‘un-Islamic’ means was declared illegal and made eligible for confiscation by the 
cleric-dominated state.”100 Karbassain holds that the near destruction of the private sector due to 
the nationalization of virtually every aspect of the economic activity  crippled the economic well-
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being of Iran. A direct result of the seizure of properties was the mass emigration from the 
country. Those educated, Westernized businessmen who had prospered under the White 
Revolution were targeted by the new regime, so it was these entrepreneurs and professional 
managers, those with the proper skills and experience in running businesses, who fled the 
country. Karbassian offers a scathing criticism of the Islamic Republic’s removal of the infant 
private sector that managed to develop in the 1970s under the Shah’s guidance. “The confiscated 
enterprises fell into the hands of inexperienced, lower-level - but ideologically correct - state 
employees who possessed no management skills.”101  The ensuing mismanagement crippled 
many businesses which only added to the chaotic state of the economy. 
Global Impact of the Iranian Revolution  
 Though Khomeini was now effectively in charge of Iranian affairs, fear of the Shah’s 
return persisted in the new government throughout much of the remainder of 1979. The Iranian 
fear of foreign interference was palpable: “Wild rumors circulated about coups, hidden armies, 
and SAVAK agents-at-large. . . . stories abounded about Shah loyalists and SAVAK officials 
hiding in the American embassy compound.”102 This paranoia increased anti-American attitudes, 
ultimately  resulting in the takeover of the American embassy on November 4, 1979, by a group 
of 500 militants claiming they were ‘students’ and ‘Followers of the Imam’s Line.’103 Sixty-three 
Americans, including military personal and government employees, were taken captive by these 
militants. Just two weeks prior, the Shah had been admitted to the United States for critical 
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medical treatment. This enraged the more radical Mujahidin warriors who saw his admittance 
into the United States as a telling sign of old treachery; they believed the Shah was returning to 
Washington to plot a coup that would enable him to return to power.104 Government buildings 
and signs of Americanism in Iran were the constant target of attacks during 1979.
 Prime Minister Bazargan stated that international law would be respected and the 
hostages released, but his authority as Prime Minister was crumbling quickly. Supported by 
Khomeini and the mullahs, the militants made it  clear that they would not give Barzagan the 
authority to hand over the hostages.105  International pressures and the question of political 
supremacy in the Islamic Republic turned the hostage crisis into a media frenzy. This crisis was 
compounded by the Shah’s movements throughout the world as he searched for a new country in 
which to reside. Almost universal reluctance of all nations to admit the Shah displayed the 
potency of this hostage situation: no nation wanted to be put in the middle of the Revolutionary 
Council and the Shah, for the Revolutionary government demanded that their former leader be 
returned to Iran to answer for his alleged crimes. After much political and diplomatic debate, the 
hostages were released in 1981, just  minutes after Ronald Reagan was sworn into office as the 
next President of the United States. 
 Another consideration concerning the global effects of Revolution can be seen when 
analyzing the Soviet  response, for the creation of the Islamic Republic did not solely affect the 
Western world. The Soviet Union, too, was directly threatened by Khomeini’s new regime. His 
calls to spread the Islamic Revolution across the globe was troubling for the Soviet government 
because the Soviet Union bordered several Muslim provinces, like Uzbek SSR and Turkmen 
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SSR, and included millions of Muslims.106  This threat of Islamic expansion and revolution 
compelled the Soviets to invade the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in December 1979 in 
an attempt to contain the spread of the Islamic Revolution. This conflict  would span eight years. 
During this war, a charismatic young fighter named Osama Bin Laden emerged to assist the 
Mujahiden warriors against the Soviet invasion. His fierce engagement of the Soviet invaders 
established Bin Laden as an idol of many Arab revolutionaries. The Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan added to the intensity of the violence and the overall growing instability  in the 
Middle East in the twentieth century. 
 A third, significant consideration in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution was the Iran-
Iraq war. Lasting between 1980-8, this war drastically depleted the Iranian economy, making life 
for the average Iranian even more dire than before Khomeini came to power. Similar to the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein felt equally  threatened by 
Khomeini’s calls for a worldwide Islamic Revolution given Iraq’s shared border with Iran and 
the fact that Iraq, like Iran, has a predominantly Shi’a population. Saddam, a member of the 
Sunni Muslim Ba’ath Party, had recently ascended to the Iraqi Presidency on July 16, 1979, 
about five months after the Ayatollah established himself as Supreme Leader of the Islamic 
Republic. Saddam used brutal repression against the Kurds and Shi’a Muslims in Iraq to ensure 
subordination to his rule, for the Sunni Ba’ath Party minority ruled over a Shi’a majority  in Iraq. 
Fearing that Khomeini’s Shi’a fundamentalist regime in Iran would spread across the border 
causing a potential revolt in the beginning years of his reign as President, Saddam launched a 
preemptive invasion of Iran. By  attempting to subdue the influence of the Islamic Republic, 
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Saddam was supported by the United States with weapons and mustard gas to use against the 
Iranian forces and against the Iraqi Kurds.107  While Saddam was initially  successful in his 
invasion attempts, his fortunes changed rapidly. Khomeini was able to repel his forces and start a 
counter-strike along the Iranian border and with the Kurdish separatists in northern Iraq.
 The conflict evolved into a bloody war of attrition. The Iran-Iraq war is often compared 
to the first World War due to the nature of trench warfare and the use of human wave attacks. 
Yet, at  the end of the eight years of fighting, no significant border changes occurred and religious 
tensions only increased. Though Saddam was supported with billions of dollars in arms from the 
United States and other Western powers, he was still not able to defeat Khomeini. This failure 
emboldened the divine right belief of the Shi’a fundamentalists, creating sharper divisions in the 
contrasts between the Sunni minority leadership  and the suppressed Shi’a majority in Iraq. The 
stability  of the region and world market prices in oil was directly threatened by this conflict. The 
failed war with Iraq further disillusioned the tacit supporters of the Revolution, for Khomeini’s 
promises for prosperity  were not realized. The faltering economic conditions inherent under the 
Shah’s rule were perpetuated by the Iran-Iraq war. Similar to the Shah before him, Khomeini was 
equally unwilling to compromise with the Iranian masses or to engage dissenting parties 
politically. When such disenchanted Iranians attempted to protest or organize dissent, they were 
met with a familiar policy: demonstrations against Khomeini’s reign were silenced and 
opposition forces, largely lead by the leftist Mujahiden warriors, were executed.108  While the 
Islamic Republic had been realized, the average Iranian was just as economically disadvantaged, 
if not more so, as he was during the Shah’s reign. The Revolution had simply replaced the 
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modernizing, Western influenced monarch with a new Shi’a fundamentalist autocrat in power. 
 Mansour Farhang, former Iranian ambassador to the Untied Nations reporting for The 
Nation, was highly critical of Khomeini’s rule, calling it  a “reign of terror.” “Before the 
revolutionary  victory  of February 1979, Iranians suffered under the political and economic 
oppression of the Shah. In the present struggle, we are opposing not only  political and economic 
oppression but also cultural and religious totalitarianism.”109 He explains how Khomeini and his 
thugs, known as the Revolutionary  Guard, mandated all aspects of life in the Islamic Republic, 
for example, through the prohibition of joyous or sensuous art and entertainment from public 
places.110 While originally moderate in their interpretation of Islamic laws and judicial practices 
in the years leading up to the Shah’s removal from power, Khomeini and his supporters instead 
became even more brutal and authoritative than the Shah himself once they achieved power.  
Torture is routine in the Islamic Republic. Amnesty International 
puts the number of political executions in Iran since the fall of the 
Shah at 6,108 but estimates that there have been thousands more. 
The fundamentalists have successfully built a theocratic state, but 
in the process they have become the engineers of the most joyless 
revolutionary  transformation in the modern world. They  seem to be 
possessed by morbidity; they represent the victory of ignorance 
over injustice.111
The arbitrariness of law enforcement in order to enforce Islamic law in all aspects of life, the 
systematic silencing of political opponents, either through torture or murder, and the repression 
of the middle class intelligentsia was the unfortunate reality  for those living in the Islamic 
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Republic. Clearly, Farhang’s outlook on post-revolutionary Iran is bleak. Though the Revolution 
had come, had any true change developed for the average Iranian with the removal of the Shah? 
PART V - “MEET THE NEW BOSS, SAME AS THE OLD BOSS” -  A DISHEARTENING 
REALITY PERSISTS 
 The Shah died of complications from lymphoma in Egypt in 1980. His wife, Farah 
Pahlavi, was interviewed on March 10, 2004, by Haleh Esfandiari, the Director of the Middle 
East Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC, to 
promote the release of her upcoming book titled An Enduring Love: My Life with the Shah, A 
Memoir. They  discussed her difficulties in the years after the Revolution as those close to the 
family, still living in Iran, were executed by Khomeini’s forces. Despite the atrocities committed 
by SAVAK under the Shah’s watch, Empress Farah Pahlavi remains supportive of her husband’s 
reign while simultaneously acknowledging his failures to enable political participation during the 
White Revolution
But maybe with hindsight, if more political participation had 
happened before - and this is what my husband wanted for us - he 
said he wanted his country, which was almost in the Middle Ages 
from the beginning of the 20th century, to be progressive, to 
develop, to go to modernity and also to solve the problem of 
literacy and slowly  open up to more political participation, because 
in our countries, we cannot become democracies overnight. It 
takes, it  took, decades for other countries. And he really wanted to 
open up slowly; but unfortunately, the moment this opening 
happened was the worst moment and it ended up the way  we saw 
it.112
Farah’s vain attempt to posthumously improve the reputation of her husband is inadequate. 
While it could be argued that the Shah’s desire to increase the economic vitality  of Iran was 
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noble, the brutal repression of political dissent through imprisonment, torture, and murder is 
inexcusable. Clearly, these policies do not represent a desire to, in Farah’s words, “slowly open 
up to more political participation.” Many Iranians genuinely  believed in the late 1970s and in the 
early months of the Islamic Republic that, with Khomeini’s emergence as the Twelfth Imam, Iran 
would begin to politically develop more equitably as a nation. The Islamic Republic, however, 
disillusioned the masses, for they were presented with essentially  the same tactics of repressing 
political dissent and a comparably unstable economy that had existed under the Shah.
 Fred Halliday offers a unique perspective on the events that led to the Iranian Revolution. 
He argues, “the originality of the Iranian Revolution resides neither in its ‘traditional,’ nor in its 
‘modern’ character but in the interaction of the two.”113 The establishment of a theocracy led by  a 
Supreme Leader was inherently revolutionary  in nature. Further, he asserts that the relative 
suddenness of the revolution was also notable, explaining that “few people, whether observers or 
participants, were conscious even six months before the Shah fell that the regime was in serious 
trouble.”114  A final deviation of the Iranian Revolution when compared to the other great 
revolutions was the lack of a war or international struggle in the years preceding the revolution; 
Iran was not weakened by such a foreign entanglement. The Iranian Revolution was largely a 
populist movement. “The populists, unrivaled in their ability to communicate with the masses in 
an easy language, championed the radical programs and ideas advocated by the left, like 
nationalization of industry and anti-imperialism. They adroitly  clothed them in Shi’i garb and 
made them attractive to the masses.”115
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 Halliday outlines a five-point explanation of the causes of the revolution, with the 
economic instability caused by rampant inflation reigning as chiefly important. But these 
economic woes proved politically  potent as well, for the Shah did not enable political 
participation within his steps towards modernization. Halliday is correct in stating that one of the 
Shah’s “fatal weaknesses” was his failure to sway the new middle class, the people that 
benefitted from his reign, and who certainly could not have been as financially  successful 
without him, to actively support his rule.116 Consequently, the opposition was able to draw from 
both the beneficiaries and the victims of the Shah’s reign in order to ultimately remove him from 
power.
 A significant element of the Iranian Revolution was the role of Khomeini himself, as a 
religious authority, in organizing a massive governmental overthrow. However, it  would be 
incorrect to conclude that the opposition led by  Khomeini was unified in its desires to instill an 
Islamic Republic established to follow the guidelines of the Shari’a Law. There are two primary 
explanations for why the Revolution succeeded. The first is the Shah’s autocratic rule which 
prevented any  legitimate form of political opportunities for the dissent. This failure, coupled with 
the brutality of SAVAK repression tactics, pushed the otherwise moderate factions of the 
opposition into increasingly desperate measures. As the riots of 1978 increased in brutality, it 
appeared that rallying around the mysterious Ayatollah was the only way  to defeat the Shah’s 
oppressive reign. Yet, upon seizing power, Khomeini alienated the moderate elements of the 
opposition that  enabled his rise to prominence. He did not allow for political participation and 
continued to imprison, torture, and murder political opponents. A second cause of the Iranian 
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Revolution can be found in the Shah’s failed economic policies. In the initial years of the White 
Revolution, his program appeared promising. GDP was on the rise, new industries were 
introduced to Iran, and the improvements in infrastructure enabled more mobility. Yet with the 
economic recession of 1973, coupled with the OPEC embargo, a growing number of Iranians 
became again disenfranchised with the Shah’s regime. After being uprooted from their traditional 
agricultural jobs, thousands of Iranians were forced to flee to the growing cities in an often futile 
search for jobs. The ulama was successful in its attempt to capitalize on this disenfranchisement.
 Again, it must be remembered that this Revolution was a revolt against the Shah, not for 
Khomeini. While strict Shi’a religious adherence certainly played a crucial role in bringing about 
the Iranian Revolution, the failures of the Shah must also be taken into account.  In hindsight, the 
Iranian Revolution appears as an inevitable outgrowth of the Shah’s policies. The Iranian 
Revolution was not just an overthrow grounded in a radical religious movement; indeed, many 
members of the opposition forces did not wish for the imposition of the Islamic Republic. As the 
Shah’s regime tightened, it became increasingly  clear to the more moderate elements of the 
opposition that joining Khomeini provided the only  way to overthrow the Shah. Weighing their 
chances, these moderate opposition members rationalized that anything would be better than 
living under the current oppression perpetrated by the Shah. 
 The Iranian Revolution provides a context for understanding contemporary developments 
such as those currently  in Syria, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. As the revolutionary forces attempt to 
establish more political representation, government accountability, and protection of human 
rights, they  are slaughtered by their own rulers. To avoid the repressive horrors of post-
Revolutionary  Iran, a clear vision with specific policies must be established by the revolutionary 
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forces to genuinely enhance the well-being of Middle Eastern peoples. The failures of the Iranian 
Revolution to improve the well-being of the average Iranian citizen offers a cautionary  tale for 
today’s revolutionary fighters. Hopefully, the lessons from the Iranian Revolution will 
demonstrate the need for legitimate political change in the Middle East. The multi-faceted nature 
of the Iranian Revolution is significant  and unique, and remains to this day the most influential 
event in Middle Eastern politics in the modern era. 
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